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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of ﬁscal policy in providing macroeco-
nomic stabilisation in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian
model of a monetary union which incorporates persistence in inﬂation, and exam-
ine non-cooperative interactions of ﬁscal and monetary authorities. We ﬁnd that
particularly when inﬂation is persistent, the use of ﬁscal policy for stabilisation can
signiﬁcantly improve welfare over and above that which arises through the working
of automatic stabilisers. We conclude that a regulatory framework for ﬁscal policy
in a monetary union should allow a role for active ﬁscal stabilisation.
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11 Introduction
How important is ﬁscal policy for macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union? This
is an important question for members of European Monetary Union, and will become an
important question for the UK should it join EMU. The present paper aims to provide
an answer to this question using a microfounded New Keynesian analysis.
In a single economy, like the UK, there is now a consensus that ﬁscal policy should not
be used for short run economic stabilisation, apart from letting the automatic stabilisers
operate, and that it should be designed primarily to prevent growing public debt, so as to
ensure long term ﬁscal solvency.1 This consensus does not exist in the case of monetary
union. Within the union all member countries have a common interest rate, and as a
result monetary policy cannot be used to smooth asymmetric shocks. If there is no ﬁscal
stabilisation then such shocks need to be absorbed by competitiveness changes. These
changes need to come about through the relative inﬂation rate being lower in a country
suﬀering a negative shock, leading to an improvement in competitiveness in that country
and a resulting increase in its net exports. This adjustment mechanism may be very slow.
This line of reasoning has led to the current strong criticism of the Stability and Growth
Pact. Fiscal policy, which can be applied asymmetrically across the union, might aid the
adjustment process. Westaway (2003) shows in an empirical model of E.M.U. that ‘active’
ﬁscal policy rules for stabilisation can signiﬁcantly improve adjustment to equilibrium in
the face of such asymmetric shocks, over and above the ‘passive’ improvements provided
by allowing automatic stabilisers to operate. However, a satisfactory assessment of the
welfare gains of such improvements in stabilisation requires a microfounded theoretical
framework, something which we provide here.
Clearly the gains provided by ﬁscal stabilisation can only be large if macroeconomic
volatility has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the welfare of individual agents. In the microfounded
New Keynesian analysis we undertake here, we ﬁnd that in a monetary union, both the
total costs of macroeconomic volatility and the proportion of them that can be eliminated
by active ﬁscal stabilisation increase when there is persistence in the inﬂation process.
With realistic levels of persistence, we show that active ﬁscal stabilisation provides large
welfare gains compared to the benchmark scenario of only using automatic stabilisers.
We show that the majority of costs of macroeconomic volatility come from asymmetric
supply shocks, and that it is the ability of ﬁscal policy to control these shocks that lead
to the vast majority of the gains from ﬁscal stabilisation.
Our work builds on existing investigations of monetary union using microfounded New
Keynesian models, developed by Benigno (2003), and extended by Beetsma and Jensen
(2002), Beetsma and Jensen (2003) to include ﬁscal policy. We extend this framework in
three ways.
Firstly, we introduce realistic changes in the structure of the model that cause a greater
role for macroeconomic stabilisation. The most important modiﬁcation is the introduc-
tion of persistence in inﬂation due to a fraction of price-setters who are backward-looking
and use a rule of thumb to set prices, following Steinsson (2003). The quicker prices
can adjust, the smaller will be the welfare gains from entirely eliminating macroeconomic
volatility and smaller still the gains in using ﬁscal policy for stabilisation. Persistence
1An overview for the U.K. is given by Treasury (2003)
1in inﬂation slows down this adjustment and so increases the role for ﬁscal stabilisation.
We can increase the lags with which rule of thumb of price setters respond to changes in
demand. We ﬁnd that a relatively small lengthening in this lag structure can cause a very
large increase in the possible gains from ﬁscal stabilisation. Additionally, we introduce
habit persistence in consumer behaviour as supported empirically (see Fuhrer (2000)).
While habit persistence does aﬀect the response of the system to shocks, we ﬁnd that it
does not greatly aﬀect the case for ﬁscal stabilisation.
Secondly, we change the common assumption that ﬁscal and monetary authorities
cooperate in pursuit of shared objectives2. Instead of this we model a non-cooperative
game with diﬀering objectives.3 Apart from providing a more realistic picture of monetary
and ﬁscal interactions, allowing ﬁscal and monetary authorities to have separate objectives
p e r m i t su st ov a r yt h el e v e lo fﬁscal stabilisation (which is done by altering the objectives
of ﬁscal authorities) without altering the objectives of monetary policy.
Thirdly, we extend the Beetsma and Jensen (2003) framework so as to study a mone-
tary union open to the rest of the world, rather than assuming a ‘global’ monetary union.
In our model, the rest of the world is a third large country (large enough not to be aﬀected
by the behaviour of the union). The relationship between the monetary union and the
rest of the world is analogous to the relationship between a small open economy and the
rest of the world described in Gali and Monacelli (2002). The purpose of this extension
is to further explore the conventional wisdom, appealed to above, that ﬁscal policy is
only useful in stabilising asymmetric shocks. In a ‘global’ monetary union following a
symmetric shock, both ﬁscal and monetary policy will act on demand and thus monetary
policy can fully replace any role for ﬁscal policy. In an open economy setting, the fact
that interest rates also act on the exchange rate between the union and the rest of the
world allows a second channel for stabilisation, which in turn might create a role for ﬁscal
policy (a second instrument) in dealing with symmetric shocks. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that
ﬁscal policy provides no signiﬁcant advantage in stabilising symmetric shocks, and may
in fact be (slightly) detrimental.
We evaluate welfare in our model using a microfounded measure of welfare. The
extensions described above cause this measure to be quite complex. Because of this, we
give both monetary and ﬁscal authorities simple and standard objective functions which
are much simpler than the true measure of welfare. We do this because a simple objective
function is more likely to capture the actual behaviour of the authority. For example
a standard loss function which penalises deviations of inﬂation from its target and of
output from its natural rate captures the essential features of a remit likely to be given
to the central bank. This is what we assume for the monetary authority. We assume
that the loss function of ﬁscal authorities, as well as penalising deviations in output and
inﬂation (so ﬁscal policy supports monetary stabilisation), also penalises deviations of
the ﬁscal deﬁcit from its equilibrium level. Again we argue that this is more likely to
2See, Benigno and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2003)
among others.
3Engwerda, van Arle, and Plasmans (2001) analyse macroeconomic adjustment in a non-cooperative
setup for a dynamic stylized model of the monetary union, but they are focused on diﬀerences between co-
operative and non-cooperative outcomes and only consider a Nash open-loop game between the monetary
and ﬁscal authorities.
2capture the essential features of a remit which could be given to the ﬁscal authorities. We
then rank the equilibrium game outcomes produced under these objectives for ﬁscal and
monetary authorities according to the theoretically correct measure of social welfare. We
ﬁnd that the gains of ﬁscal stabilisation can be large when ﬁscal authorities are guided by
such a simple loss function; these gains would then be likely to increase further if ﬁscal
authorities were to use an objective function more closely related to true social welfare.
W ev a r yt h ea m o u n to fﬁscal stabilisation by varying the weight placed on ﬁscal deﬁcits
in the ﬁs c a la u t h o r i t i e s ’l o s sf u n c t i o n s .T h el a r g e ri st h i sw e i g h t ,t h el e s st h eﬁscal author-
ity will use policy to stabilise output and inﬂation. We compare two extreme scenarios.
The ﬁrst of these has the weight on the ﬁscal deﬁc i tw h i c hp r o d u c e st h eb e s to u t c o m e
in terms of social welfare.4 The second has a very large weight, so high as to ensure
that there is never any change in the budget deﬁcit — this embodies extremely strong
restrictions to ﬁscal policy of the kind which might bind when countries’ ﬁscal policies
are completely constrained. In between these extremes we consider the outcome when
there is constant government spending and so automatic stabilisers are allowed to operate
(henceforth referred to as the automatic stabilisers case).
We solve the policy game under monetary leadership.5 We note that alternative lead-
ership assumptions will primarily aﬀect the way that ﬁscal policy contributes to the sta-
bilisation of symmetric shocks, since monetary policy has no eﬀect on outcomes caused
by asymmetric shocks, while we ﬁnd here that by far the most important inﬂuence of
ﬁscal policy is in stabilising asymmetric shocks. Nonetheless, it is clearly important to
see whether alternative leadership assumptions might produce diﬀerent results, but this
topic is left for future research.
We also follow the papers cited above in not extending the analysis to study the eﬀects
on government behaviour of a government solvency constraint; the focus here is on the
short-run stabilisation of ﬁscal policy, assuming that this will not be restricted by solvency
constraints. An analysis of solvency is left for future research.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical structure of
model. Calibration of the model is discussed in Section 3. The main results are presented
in Section 4.
4In fact this is the best outcome in terms of social welfare that we can calculate. As ν becomes small,
it is increasingly diﬃcult to achieve convergence in the iterative procedure which solves the Nash policy
game of ﬁscal authorities. When we are constrained by this convergence problem, we use the best value
of ν in the range where we can solve the game. This gives a lower bound for the beneﬁts of ﬁscal policy,
and so does not weaken the results obtained.
5The monetary authority will be ‘large,’ because it sets the interest rate for the whole union but the
ﬁscal authorities of the countries wil be ‘smaller’ since they set policy separately in each country. This
has been advanced as a reason as to why the monetary leadership assumption may be more appropriate
in a monetary union. This choice about leadership may make relatively little diﬀerence as suggested
above. Studying level bias, rather than stabilisation bias as we do here, Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and
Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁscal leadership is preferable to monetary leadership.
32 The Model
2.1 Overall Structure of the Model and Notation
Our model of EMU is as follows. We model a monetary union of two identical small open
economies, which is open to the rest of the world. In each country there are the following
features:
(i) There is a Phillips curve in which domestic inﬂation in each country is inﬂuenced
by aggregate demand and expected and past inﬂation. The persistence in inﬂation comes
through a fraction of price-setters using a rule of thumb. Empirical evidence also suggests
al a gi nt h ei n ﬂu e n c eo fd e m a n do ni n ﬂation, and we can model a lengthened lag structure
b ya l t e r i n gt h er u l eo ft h u m b .
(ii) There is an intertemporal IS curve treating all private expenditure as consumption,
and including the possibility of habit persistence.
(iii) There is a linearised GDP identity in each country which links aggregate output,
aggregate private and public consumption, and the terms of trade.
For the union as a whole there are the following features.
(iv) Linkages between countries in the union: higher expenditure in one country causes
an increase in exports from the other country, and higher prices in one country impact
on inﬂation in another country by increasing the price of its imports, but there is no
possibility of currency movements between the countries. Financial markets are complete
and there is perfect risk sharing.
(v) There is a ﬂoating exchange rate between the union and the rest of the world: the
exchange rate is determined by UIP. This means that monetary policy in the union can
inﬂuence union-wide inﬂation by inﬂuencing the level of this exchange rate.
Through the text we will use the following notation:
Ca — consumption basket in country a
Pa — price of consumption basket in country a (in country a’s currency)
PHa — price of domestically produced goods in country a (in country a’s currency)
P∗b
Ha — price of domestically produced goods in country a, exported to b and measured
in country b’s currency
P∗w
Ha — price of domestically produced goods in country a, exported to w, and measured
in country w’s currency
PHb — price of goods produced in country b, imported from b, a n dm e a s u r e di nc o u n t r y
a’s currency
PHw — price of goods produced in country w, imported from w, and measured in
country a’s currency
P∗
b — price of consumption basket in country b, measured in country b’s currency
P∗
w — price of consumption basket in country w, measured in country w’s currency
Foreign currency (for country a) denomination is denoted with asterisk.
We derive all equations for country a and then use the fact that country b is identical
to a in order to write down equations for country b.
42.2 Behaviour of the Private Sector
2.2.1 Maximisation problem
Each of our small economies is inhabited by a large number of individuals. Each repre-
sentative individual is a yeoman-farmer, who specialises in the production of one diﬀer-
entiated good, denoted by z, and spends h(z) of eﬀort on its production. He consumes a
consumption basket C, and also derives utility from per capita government consumption











s−1,ξ s)+f(Gs,ξ s) − v(hs(z),ξ s)] (1)
In each of the two economies the consumption basket consists of three composite
goods, the domestic composite good (produced in the home country, subscripts Ha,Hb),
the foreign composite good from the other small open economy (produced in the foreign
country, subscripts Hb,Ha) and the good produced in the rest of the world, subscript
Hw. Each composite good consists of a continuum of produced goods z ∈ [0,1].T h e
utility function u(.) incorporates habit persistence in a standard way by incorporating
dependence on consumption in the period before. The parameter ρ then determines the
extent of habit persistence. We also allow for taste/technology shocks ξ.
An individual chooses optimal consumption and work eﬀort to maximise the criterion
(1) subject to the demand system and the intertemporal budget constraint:
∞ X
s=t













1+ik, and it is short-term interest rate. Here we assume that the labour
income w is taxed at the rate τ.
2.2.2 Demand system and Price Indexes






where the asterisk denotes consumption of foreign goods, whose price is denominated in
foreign currency. Namely, good z,p r o d u c e da th o m eHa, is consumed either at home,
cHa,t(z), or abroad, c∗
Ha,t(z), and ‘abroad’ includes the other small open economy and the
rest of the world: c∗b
Ha,t(z) and c∗w
Ha,t(z). ga(z) is government consumption. We assume
5that the government in each country consumes the domestically produced good only, so
gHa = ga.
All goods are aggregated into a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consumption index with the
elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods given by  >1 (the time index t is





























Every household consumes both domestic and foreign goods with the elasticity of
































d is the share of consumption of domestic goods, αa
n is the share of consumption
of goods imported from the neighbour country (the other small open economy). The





























































































































In introducing the international dimension, we closely follow Gali and Monacelli
(2002). Since the world economy is large it can be considered as an essentially closed










We also assume that the private and public consumption in the rest of the world are
perfect substitutes.























which are the relative prices of foreign goods in country a’s currency and in the foreign










The household optimisation problem is standard (Fuhrer (2000)) and, after linearisation,
it leads to the following ﬁrst order conditions (see the Additional Appendix, available
from authors upon request, for a derivation):
cs = βφρcs+1 + φρcs−1 +
(1 − βρ)φ
(1 − σ)
λs + εs (15)
where
λs = λs+1 − σ(is − πs+1) (16)





1 − σβρ+ βρ2(1 − σ)
.
The parameter ρ determines how much current consumption depends on past: when it
is zero we have a standard forward-looking Euler equation for consumption, and when
it is strictly positive we get habit persistence. The shock ε is directly related to the
taste/technology shock ξ in the utility function. The coeﬃcient 1/σ represents the coef-
ﬁcient of relative risk aversion associated with private consumption (and σ i st h er a t eo f
intertemporal substitution). These equations are written in terms of ‘gap’ variables, i.e.
in terms of the log-deviation from the eﬃcient (given distortionary taxation) ﬂexible-price
equilibrium.
2.2.4 Pricing decisions
In order to describe price setting decisions we, following Steinsson (2003), split individuals
into two groups according to their pricing behaviour. A proportion of agents 1 − ω are
forward-looking and set prices optimally given Calvo-type constraints on price setting,
while a fraction ω are backward-looking and set their prices according to a rule of thumb.
7In each period, each agent is able to reset her price with probability 1−γ, and otherwise,
with probability γ, her price will rise at the steady state rate of domestic inﬂation. The

















Ha,t−1 is the average domestic price in the previous period, ΠHa,t−1 = PHa,t−1/PHa,t−2
is past period growth rate of prices and Yat−k/Y n
at−k is output relative to the ﬂexible-price
equilibrium. We assume that there can be more than one lag in output aﬀecting price-
setting. We present the algebra for N =2 ,a st h i si sa m p l ys u ﬃcient to demonstrate the
eﬀects of a lengthened lag structure.
For the whole economy the resulting Phillips curve will take the form (see Steinsson
(2003) and Appendix A for a detailed derivation):
πHat = χβπHat+1 +( 1− χ)πHat−1 + κccat + κx0xat + κx1xat−1 (18)
+ κx2xat−2 + κsdsas + κsnsbs
and all coeﬃcients are given in Appendix A. The distortionary wage income tax τ alters
the equilibrium allocation of consumption and labour, but has no eﬀect on the dynamic
equations for log-deviations from the ﬂexible price equilibrium (see Appendix A for deriva-
tion).
The Phillips curve (18) has a familiar structure where both current and past output
have an eﬀect on inﬂation. Its ﬁnal speciﬁcation was discussed in Steinsson (2003) and
we brieﬂy repeat it in Appendix A, but explaining our modiﬁcations in detail. In the
case when all consumers are forward-looking, i.e. ω =0 , this Phillips curve collapses to
the standard forward-looking Phillips curve (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). If all
consumers use the rule of thumb in price-setting decisions, i.e. ω =1 , it can be brought
into the form of ‘accelerationist’ Phillips curve (see Appendix A.2).
T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h et e r m so ft r a d ef o rb o t hc o u n t r i e si sd u et ot h ew e d g eb e t w e e nt h e
consumption of basket of goods and production of a single domestic good.
The system (15) and (18) is formally equivalent to the optimising behaviour of a
representative agent who maximises (1) subject to an aggregate ‘law of motion’ of the
economy (the demand system, the intertemporal budget constraint and pricing decisions)
when the policymaker’s behaviour is taken to be an exogenous process that is independent
of the individual’s actions.
2.2.5 Aggregate Demand
We derive an aggregate demand for country a, following Gali and Monacelli (2002), which




























8where sat and sbt denote log-deviations of the terms of trade for countries a and b with
respect to the rest of the world, country w.T h ep a r a m e t e rθ denotes the share of private
consumption in output, so 1 − θ is the share of the government sector in the economy.
2.2.6 Putting things together
We now write down the ﬁnal system of equations. We simplify the analysis and notation
by assuming that countries a and b are identical in all their parameters. We also substitute
out for consumer inﬂation in terms of domestic inﬂation and exchange rates. The system
can be written as:
cat = βφρcat+1 + φρcat−1 +
(1 − βρ)φ
(1 − σ)
λat + εat (20)
cbt = βφρcbt+1 + φρcbt−1 +
(1 − βρ)φ
(1 − σ)
λbt + εbt (21)
λat = λat+1 − σ(it − (1 − αn)πHat+1 − αnπHbt+1 − (1 − αd − αn)∆sat+1) (22)
λbt = λbt+1 − σ(it − (1 − αd)πHat+1 − αdπHbt+1 − (1 − αd − αn)∆sat+1) (23)
πHa,t = χβπHa,t+1 +( 1− χ)πHa,t−1 + κcλat + κx0xat + κx1xat−1 + κx2xat−2 (24)
+ κsdsat + κsnsbt + ηat
πHb,t = χβπHb,t+1 +( 1− χ)πHb,t−1 + κcλbt + κx0xbt + κx1xbt−1 + κx2xbt−2 (25)
+ κsdsbt + κsnsat + ηbt








)sat − 2ηθαnαdsbt + ζwt
(26)








)sbt − 2ηθαnαdsat + ζwt
(27)
it = sat+1 − sat − πwt+1 + πHat+1 + ζit (28)
sbt = sat − sat−1 − πHbt + πHat + sbwt−1 (29)
Equations (20) - (23) are the consumption equations (15) and (16) written in terms
of domestic inﬂation. Equations (26) and (27) are aggregate demand equations from
(19). Equation (28) is the familiar uncovered interest rate parity condition written using
terms of trade and inﬂation, and equation (29) follows from the requirement of the ﬁxed
nominal exchange rate between countries a and b, so the terms of trade sat and sbt are
not independent. Shocks ε are directly related to technology/taste shocks ξ in (1). In
the ﬁnal speciﬁcation we add extra ‘cost-push’ shocks to the inﬂation equations (24)-(25).
Shocks ζwt are shocks to the rest of the world’s consumption and shocks ζit are shocks to
the rest-of-the-world interest rate, or a UIP shock.
2.3 Behaviour of the Monetary Authorities
The union central bank uses the short-term interest rate as a policy instrument. We












2 +0 .5(xas + xbs)
2¤
. (30)
9In other words, the central bank targets union-wide consumer price inﬂation and output.
Although the microfounded social welfare function will include domestic inﬂation and
a more complicated structure of terms concerned with output variability and inﬂation
persistence (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Beetsma and Jensen (2003), Steinsson
(2003), and Appendix B to this paper), in this paper we study the implications of
conventional policymaking as discussed in the introduction. We take the value of 0.5 for
the weight on output variability as a conventional value in the literature.
2.4 Behaviour of the Fiscal Authorities
In this paper, we postulate that the ﬁscal authorities do not have any solvency concerns:
we only study the stabilisation properties of ﬁscal policy. We assume that they target
output and inﬂation (as monetary authorities do), and also target the ﬁscal deﬁcit. This
could reﬂect either a desire to run a balanced budget, or the impact of a regulatory







































where dt denotes the primary deﬁcit which can be written as
δddt =( 1− θ)gat − τxt
where τ is wage income tax rate and δd is equilibrium level of the real primary deﬁcit. ν
denotes the weight the ﬁscal authority places on minimising the deivation of the deﬁcit
from the equilibrium primary deﬁcit.
2.5 Social Loss Function
The three policymakers solve their optimisation problems each period, given initial con-
ditions and time preferences. The resulting optimal policy reactions lead to stochastic
equilibria that should be compared across a suitable metric, independent of initial condi-
tions. The obvious choice of this metric is the microfounded union-wide social loss, which
on the convenient assumption that social planner does not discount the future, is a sum
of unconditional variances with microfounded weights.
The union-wide social loss function takes the form (see Appendix B for a discussion
of the derivation):
W = λπ(var(πHa)+var(πHb)) + λπλc(var(ca − ρca,−1)+var(cb − ρcb,−1)) (33)
+ λπ(λx + µx)(var(xat)+var(xbt)) + λπλg(var(ga)+var(gb))
+ λπµ∆π(var(∆πHa)+var(∆πHb))
+2 λπµxx(cov(xa,x a,−1)+cov(xb,x b,−1))
+2 λπµx∆π(cov(xa,−1,∆πHa)+cov(xb,−1,∆πHb))
10There are several unconventional features of this loss function. First of all, terms
with µ−coeﬃcients are present only because of rule of thumb price setters. The presence
of these terms requires that inﬂation and output be brought back to the equilibrium
smoothly. Steinsson (2003) has shown that when the private sector is predominantly
backward-looking, terms with weights denoted by µ dominate the loss function, and the
eﬀect of other terms is negligible. For a moderate proportion of the rule of thumb price-
setters, the weight of µ−terms is limited, but not negligible.
To interpret the values of the social loss, we can express them in terms of compensating
consumption — the permanent fall in the steady state consumption level that would bal-
ance the welfare gain from eliminating the volatility of consumption, government spending
and leisure (Lucas (1987)). As explained in Appendix C, the percentage change in con-
sumption level, Ω, that is needed to compensate diﬀerences in welfare of two regimes with
social loss of W1 and W2 is given by (33):
Ω =
σ











We assume that monetary and ﬁscal authorities are engaged in a policy game with mon-
etary leadership. The monetary authorities move ﬁrst, taking into account the reaction
of the two following ﬁscal authorities and the private sector in both countries. The ﬁscal
authorities play a Nash game with each other, but they follow the monetary authority
and lead the private sector. Thus, the private sector is an ultimate follower, and its op-
timisation problem is solved out and represented by the two reaction equations, the IS
curve and the Phillips curve (20)-(25). All authorities act under discretion.
The solution of a leadership game with two optimising policymakers and the private
sector as an ultimate follower is discussed in Blake and Kirsanova (2003). Here, we extend
their analysis, since instead of one follower we have two ﬁscal authorities, who each follow
the monetary authority, but are engaged in a Nash game with each other. The Nash game
is studied in detail in the literature on macroeconomic policy coordination, see for example
Currie and Levine (1993), and its solution procedure consists essentially of two Oudiz and
Sachs (1985) algorithms (one for each ﬁscal authority) which we need to iterate between.
The Additional Appendix gives a more detailed explanation on how this is combined with
the leadership framework of Blake and Kirsanova (2003).
3C a l i b r a t i o n
Because of the microfounded nature of the model, there are relatively few parameters to
calibrate, given in Table 1. One period is taken as equal to one quarter of a year. We set
the discount factor of the private sector (and policy makers) to β =0 .99.
Perhaps the most important parameter in our model is the proportion of rule of thumb
price setters, ω. Ac o n s e n s u sﬁgure for the forward-looking component in an empirical
Phillips curve is often taken as 0.3 (see Rudebusch (2002); Batini and Nelson (2001)
11also suggest a very backwards-looking Phillips curve in the UK). Thus a forward-looking
coeﬃcient of χ =0 .3 in the Phillips curve (24)-(25) can be obtained with ω =0 .5 and
γ =0 .75. This implies that 50 percent of population reset their wages and prices not
optimally, but using the rule of thumb (17). γ =0 .75 implies that, on average, prices
last for one year (as agents are yeomen-farmers, this could also be thought of as nominal
wages being ﬁxed for one year). Table 2 shows how the weights of the Phillips curve vary
with ω given γ =0 .75.
Calibrating the IS relationship we use ρ =0 .8 for the habit persistence parameter
as originally estimated by Fuhrer (2000). Subsequent research (Boldrin, Christiano, and
Fisher (2000), Edge (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001)) suggests a range
of 0.5—0.9, but these estimates depend on the exact speciﬁcation used in the estimation,
so are not necessarily directly comparable. For the parameters related to ﬁscal policy, we
calibrate the ratio of private consumption to output as 65 percent, according to data for
the nineties for the UK; and we assume that the equilibrium ratio of domestic debt to
output is 60 percent. Then the debt accumulation equation gives us the equilibrium level
o ft h ep r i m a r ys u r p l u sa n dt h et a xr a t e .
We specify the parameters δ1 and δ2 for rule of thumb price-setting in (17) which
determine the sensitivity of rule of thumb price setters to (lags in) demand in the following
way. We ﬁrst calibrate a value for their sum δ = δ1+δ2. This is calibrated using diﬀerent
assumptions from Steinsson’s. Steinsson assumes that the two extreme versions of the
Phillips curve — forward-looking and accelerationist — should give the same coeﬃcient
on demand pressure in the Phillips curve κ = κc + κx0 + κx1 + κx2 i.e. he makes the
constraint that with a constant δ the sensitivity to demand in the Phillips curve should
be invariant with the level of inﬂation persistence. This constraint determines both δ
and κ. However, a problem with taking this approach is that it can result in a coeﬃcient
κ that is unrealistically small. We instead take an empirical estimate of κ.E s t i m a t e s
of κ diﬀer widely, and estimates vary from 0.05 to 0.6. We choose a value of κ =0 .3
within this interval. Given any choice of the the key parameters in Table 1, we choose a
value of δ that will give κ =0 .3. To determine the lag structure, we then set δ1 = ϕδ and
δ2 =( 1− ϕ)δ. Setting ϕ =1corresponds to the Steinsson speciﬁcation, where only one
lag in demand aﬀects rule of thumb price-setting. Small changes in ϕ, however, can have
large impacts on our results.
We calibrate the standard deviations of shocks hitting the economies as follows. There
is relatively little evidence in the literature about the standard deviations of supply and
demand shocks. Theoretical literature typically assumes that all standard deviations are
the same and a consensus number is 0.5%, see, e.g. Jensen and McCallum (2002), Bean,
Nikolov, and Larsen (2002). Empirical literature tends to suggest that demand shocks
have a bigger standard deviation, although the evidence is scarce with results typically
depending on goodness of ﬁt of empirical demand and supply equations (see results from
two-equation model in Bean (1998) and from a large macromodel in Barrell and Hurst
(2003)). In this paper we nevertheless assume that the standard deviation of supply
and demand shocks are equal, and all shocks are independent. We do this primarily
for simplicity and clarity, and so that the relative welfare eﬀects of supply and demand
shocks presented in Section 4 reﬂects properties of the model, rather than underlying
assumptions about the shocks. In fact, we can show that very little change occurs to the
12results of the paper if we assume, say, that the standard deviation of demand shocks is
twice that of supply shocks.
It remains to specify the common standard deviation of these shocks. We do this
so that in a single country outside the monetary union (proxied here by a monetary
union under symmetric shocks) the standard deviation of CPI inﬂation would be 0.5%
were government spending kept constant (as did Jensen and McCallum (2002)).6 This
corresponds to a standard deviation of shocks of around 0.5% for the base-line model
parametrised as above, which is widely used in the literature. Again, given any choice of
the key parameters in Table 1, we then re-calibrate the standard deviation of shocks to
ﬁt with this volatility of CPI inﬂation.
We assume that each economy consumes 30% of imported goods, 20% of which are
imported from the neighbour country in the monetary union.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Responses to shocks
The solution of this model is a set of optimal reaction rules for monetary and ﬁscal
authorities, given the model structure and the assumption that each country is subject to
idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks. We display the responses of the economy under
these rules to purely symmetric or asymmetric shocks, but it is important to note that
the rules are not derived under the assumption that shocks are symmetric or asymmetric,
but that they are uncorrelated across countries.
Figure 1 shows the responses of the economy to symmetric impulse supply and demand
shocks, and Figure 2 displays asymmetric shocks. Supply shocks are shocks to (24) and
(25), the shock terms in the Phillips curves for each country, and demand shocks are
shocks to (20) and (21), shocks to the consumption components of the IS curve for each
country. The ﬁgures show the responses for three cases: with stabilising ﬁscal policy (solid
line), with automatic stabilisers in operation (dotted line) and with constant ﬁscal deﬁcits
(dashed line). Outcomes with automatic stabilisers are obtained simply by removing ﬁscal
authorities from the game (so that government spending is kept constant) and calculating
outcomes when only monetary policy is active. Outcomes with constant deﬁcits are
obtained by introducing ﬁscal authorities into the game, but placing a very large weight
ν À 1 on the volatility of deﬁcits in the ﬁscal objectives (31)-(32). Stabilising ﬁscal policy
similarly corresponds to a small value for ν ¿ 1.
Figure 1 shows that the model produces similar responses of inﬂation and output to
symmetric shocks in all three cases, that is whether there is stabilising ﬁscal policy, or the
operation of the automatic stabilisers, or constant ﬁscal deﬁcits. As might be expected,
monetary policy can deal eﬀectively with symmetric shocks, and ﬁscal stabilisation can
produce no obvious improvement in the responses of inﬂation and output; as explained
later it actually makes things slightly worse. The diﬀerences in the trajectories when ﬁscal
policy is active are revealing. In the case of a demand shock, active ﬁscal policy takes the
6In the UK, over the period of 1991 — 2003, the standard deviation of the CPI inﬂation is 0.54% and
the standard deviation of the PPI inﬂation is 0.41%.
13Key Parameters Mnemonics Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Share of rule-of-thumb price-setters ω 0.5
Proportion of agents who able to reset their price within
ap e r i o d
1 − γ 0.25
Weight on demand pressure in the Phillips curve κ 0.3
Share of the government sector in the economy 1 − θ 0.65
Steady state ratio of domestic debt to output B/Y 0.6
Intertemporal substitution rate σ 0.5
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods
η 2.0
Elasticity of substitution between two domestic goods   5.0
Production risk aversion 1/ψ 0.5
Share of domestic goods in consumption basket αd 0.7
Openness with respect to the other small open economy αn 0.2
Implied Parameters in system (20)-(29) Mnemonics Value
Tax Rate τ 0.356
Steady state ratio of primary real surplus to output δd 0.006
Weight on forward inﬂa t i o ni nP C χ 0.3
Weight on the country’s term of trade vs. the rest of the
world in AD
θρd 0.75
Weight on the neighbour country’s term of trade vs. the
rest of the world in in AD
θρn -0.45
Implied Parameters in the Social Loss Function (33) Mnemonics Value
Consumption variability λc 0.03
Output variability λx + µx 0.22
Variability of government consumption λg 0.001
Variability of inﬂa t i o ng r o w t hr a t e µ∆π 1.25
Covariance of two output lags µxx 0.00003




Sum of demand-variability related terms λ 0.25
Table 1: Parameter values
Proportion of rule of thumb price setters, ω with γ =0 .75,β=0 .99
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
χf 1.00 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.00
χb 0.0 0.20 0.37 0.50 0.61 0.70 0.78 0.84 0.90 0.95 1.0
Table 2: Coeﬃcients of Phillips Curve
14place of higher interest rates. In the case of a supply shock ﬁscal expansion in the face of
output loss requires an even higher rise in the interest rate, which depresses consumption.
Interestingly we will see in the next section that active ﬁscal policy in the face of such
shocks reduces welfare; it is better that the shocks be taken care of by monetary policy
alone.
Figure 2 reports the response with asymmetric shocks. Such shocks cannot be dealt
with at all by monetary policy; Figure 2 conﬁrms that they produce a zero response in
interest rates. Without any ﬁscal stabilisation at all the economy experiences signiﬁcant
oscillations. This is because with a ﬁxed exchange rate and no stabilisation by monetary
policy of asymmetric shocks, the eﬀects on the price level of any changes in inﬂation need
to be removed. These changes in the price level need to come about through the relative
inﬂation rate being lower in the country in which the price level is high, leading to an
improvement in competitiveness in that country and a resulting increase in net exports.
This adjustment mechanism is cyclical because the price level tends to overshoot: if prices
are high this causes low demand and disinﬂation; when the price level, and demand, have
returned to zero prices are still falling, leading to high demand in the future, which causes
ar e t u r no fi n ﬂation. As suggested by Westaway (2003), a destabilising feedback in this
process is that described by the “Walters critique”. A downturn in a country will cause
inﬂation in that country to fall. But since the nominal interest rate for the union does
not fall, the real interest rate in the negatively aﬀected country will actually rise. This
increases rather than reduces the downturn prolonging the cycle.
Figure 2 shows that active ﬁscal policy is able to stabilise the economy in the face of
such shocks. Figure 2 also suggests that the eﬀects of the automatic stabilisers may not
produce enough stabilisation to avoid cyclical outcomes, and that active ﬁscal policy may
be necessary for this. In the case of a demand shock, active ﬁscal policy damps the eﬀects
on demand and prevents any eﬀect on inﬂation. That stops competitiveness and the real
exchange rate oscillating in the way described above. In the case of a supply shock ﬁscal
policy can make a very great diﬀerence. In the absence of ﬁscal policy, inﬂation causes
such a large output fall that inﬂation then overshoots downwards, and the resulting fall in
the price level makes output overshoot upwards again. Active ﬁscal policy makes output
recover much faster after its initial fall and prevents the downward overshoot of prices. It
is clear that such active ﬁscal policy will increase welfare.
The period of the cycles shown in Figure 2 in the absence of eﬀective ﬁscal policy
is very short (less than ten quarters), and one would believe that in reality any cycle
caused by asymmetric shocks in a monetary union is likely to have a longer period than
this. However, to capture this theoretically might require a more complex model than
that developed here (perhaps including the eﬀects of capital accumulation). In our simple
model ﬁscal policy can remove the cycle eﬀectively. In the next section it is shown that
this can cause large welfare gains, which is striking given the simple description of the
frictions in the model.
4.2 Welfare
Overall Figures 1 and 2 suggest a possible substantial gain in welfare from ﬁscal stabili-
sation. We now explore this.
15The upper panel of Figure 3 shows how social loss varies as we vary the level of ﬁscal
activity i.e. as we vary the weight ν on the volatility of deﬁcits in the ﬁscal objectives
(31)-(32). We plot the level of social loss for a particular value of ν against a measure of
the level of ﬁscal activity for that value of ν. The measure we choose is the the standard
deviation of the ﬁscal deﬁcit measured as a percentage of GDP. Values of the social loss
are plotted as a percentage of the value of social welfare when only automatic stabilisers
operate. So as we see in Figure 3, a policy of constant deﬁcits increases the social loss
by 4% in comparison to a policy of using automatic stabilisers, whereas a level of ﬁscal
activity that produces a standard deviation of 1.4% for the ﬁscal deﬁcit provides a decrease
in the social loss of almost 30%. The lowest panel of Figure 3 shows the same graph as
the upper panel, except with a standard quadratic loss function in output and inﬂation
variances rather than the microfounded social loss. Under this measure ﬁscal stabilisation
produces a more than 40% decrease in the loss.
The middle panel of Figure 3 shows what these changes in the social loss correspond
to in terms of the change of the steady state level of consumption that would be needed to
compensate for them. So a policy of constant ﬁscal deﬁcits produces a level of volatility
which would need a 0.25 % increase in steady state consumption to compensate for it
relative to the case when only automatic stabilisers operate. A policy with a degree of
ﬁscal activity which results in a standard deviation of 1.4% for ﬁscal deﬁcits (again with
deﬁcits measured as a percentage of GDP) corresponds to a non-trivial steady state gain
in consumption of over 1.5%. The lowest line indicates the consumption gain if shocks in
the economy could be entirely avoided, relative to the case with automatic stabilisers and
shocks. Thus active ﬁscal policy delivers approximately 30% of the maximum possible
consumption gain.
Figure 4 shows the breakdown of the loss as the level of ﬁscal activity varies. The upper
panel in this ﬁgure shows, for each level of ﬁscal activity, the proportion of the social loss
that is due to its major components (e.g. inﬂation volatility, output volatility etc.). As
can be seen, in addition to the volatility of output and inﬂation, large components of the
social loss come from the volatility of the change in inﬂation and the covariance between
inﬂation and output. The lower panel shows, again for each level of ﬁscal activity, what
proportions of the social loss that can be ascribed to the symmetric and asymmetric
components of supply and demand shocks respectively.
As can be seen, even with habit persistence, the vast majority of costs of volatility
are due to supply shocks, with asymmetric supply shocks being signiﬁcantly the largest
component.
This is emphasised in Figure 5, which plots the losses due to the diﬀerent shocks in
levels rather than in percentages: we normalise all values of losses by dividing them by
the value of total loss in the case when automatic stabilisers operate and the economy
is aﬀected by all shocks. The left panel shows the welfare losses measured by the micro-
founded loss function, the right panel by a traditional loss metric. We can see that ﬁscal
activity generally increases the social loss when shocks are symmetric, but that these
eﬀects are relatively small. A possible reason for this loss in welfare is that ﬁscal policy is
being pulled in unhelpful directions because it responds to the shocks in ways which are
dominated by its need to deal well with asymmetric shocks. It could also be that ﬁscal
authorities are pursuing the ‘wrong objectives’ in minimising a simple loss function (31)-
16(32) rather than the true social loss; we can see that in the right panel using a traditional
welfare metric in output and inﬂation volatility ﬁscal policy produces a small improve-
ment in the response to symmetric shocks. In both cases however, the small positive or
negative eﬀects on symmetric shocks, are outweighed by a much larger decrease in losses
when shocks are asymmetric, which are particularly large for asymmetric supply shocks.
For asymmetric shocks, we can see that the ‘rough and ready’ stabilisation provided by
a ﬁscal authority minimising a simple loss function produces large gains in (the complex
measure of) welfare.
We would expect the stabilisation of asymmetric demand shocks to improve welfare
a n dF i g u r e5s h o w st h a ti td o e ss o .H o w e v e rt h el a r g e s ta m o u n to ft h ew e l f a r ei m p r o v e -
ment comes from the stabilisation of asymmetric supply shocks. The ﬁrst reason for this
is that, even with habit persistence, the consumption equation is ‘more forward looking’
than the inﬂation process, and so demand disturbances are removed more quickly. Sec-
ond, with a monetary union, because of the ﬁxed exchange rate, the relative price level
between the two countries must return to unity (or zero in logs) following a shock. This
stabilisation of the price-level is costly because the integral of relative inﬂation rather
than its level has to come to zero following a shock. This makes inﬂation shocks more
costly in their eﬀects than shocks to demand. In eﬀect the monetary union is forcing the
economy to operate like it would with price level targeting; inﬂationary bygones cannot
be bygones. Fiscal policy can help to prevent excessive costs of this. It cannot circumvent
the constraint - but it prevents overshoot in response to it7.
In summary, we ﬁnd that automatic stabilisers produce relatively little beneﬁts in
stabilisation compared to the policy of constant deﬁcits. Active ﬁscal policy can generate
non-trivial gains in welfare, corresponding to a 1.58% increase in steady state consump-
tion. Asymmetric supply shocks cause the majority of the costs of volatility and it is the
ability of ﬁscal policy to deal with these that is responsible for the vast majority of the
gains from ﬁscal stabilisation. In contrast, ﬁscal activity slightly increases losses when
shocks are symmetric.
W en o we x p l o r eh o wt h e s er e s u l t sv a r ya sw ec h a n g et h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h es y s t e m .
4.3 Sensitivity of the Results: the Importance of Shocks, Per-
sistence and Lags
Above, we discussed the result that ﬁscal policy does not make a large quantitative dif-
ference to the response of the economy to symmetric shocks. We ﬁnd that this result
holds for all reasonable parametrisations we have tested. However the improvement in
responses to asymmetric shocks, and so the improvement in welfare, brought about by
active ﬁscal policy depends strongly on key parameters in the model: the level of habit
persistence ρ, t h ep r o p o r t i o no fr u l eo ft h u m bp r i c es e t t e r sω, and parameter ϕ which
determines the lag structure of the Phillips curve.
7Another contributing factor to the relative importance of supply shocks is that the (microfounded)
social loss places much more weight on inﬂation volatility, and on volatility in the change of inﬂation,
rather than on the volatility of output (see Table 1). Figure 6 shows the individual impact of ﬁscal
activity on the volatility of inﬂation, output, consumption and government spending.
17Table 3 shows the welfare changes for diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes and parameterisations of
the model in terms of the equivalent gain or loss in consumption measured as a percentage
of GDP. Column (1) shows the change in steady state consumption which is equivalent
to the change in welfare in moving from a policy of using automatic stabilisers to a policy
of constant deﬁcits. Column (2) shows the gain from moving from a policy of using
automatic stabilisers to active ﬁscal policy. In Column (3), we show the consumption
gain that could be obtained by entirely eliminating macroeconomic volatility (i.e. no
shocks) relative to the same policy. Comparing columns (2) to column (3) then shows the
proportion of the total costs of macroeconomic volatility that can be eliminated by using
active ﬁscal policy. Column (4) is explained below.
The ﬁrst row shows the base-line case described above. The base-line case parameters
are denoted with asterisks. The second row of Table 3 shows results for the base-line
parametrisation but with a zero level of habit persistence. The results are similar to those
in the ﬁrst row: varying the level of habit persistence ρ has relatively small eﬀects on
the potential gains from ﬁscal stabilisation compared to the base-line case. The third
row of Table 3 however shows that when the proportion of forward-looking individuals,
1 − ω, is large, the potential gains from ﬁscal stabilisation are small. The large fraction
of forward-looking price-setters implies that relative prices in the countries of the union
adjust quickly, and hence asymmetric shocks die out quickly, without any policy inter-
vention. The fourth row shows the results for the base-line levels of habit persistence
and proportion of backward-looking price setters but with a lengthened lag structure on
the demand terms in the Phillips curve, given by changing the parameter ϕ from 1 to
0.5 as described in Section 3. In this case, the welfare gain from ﬁscal stabilisation is
substantially higher than in any other cases studied.
In order to understand these numbers we present Figures 7, 8 and 9. Since the dif-
ferences in the welfare are a result of how much ﬁscal policy improves stabilisation in
t h ef a c eo fasymmetric shocks, we present impulse responses to asymmetric supply and
demand shocks only. In Figure 7 (which corresponds to the second row of Table 3), we
see that with no habit persistence the responses to asymmetric supply shocks are similar
t ot h eb a s e - l i n ec a s ei nF i g u r e2 ,b u tt h ei m p a c to fa s y m m e t r i cd e m a n ds h o c k si ss i g n i ﬁ-
cantly reduced (note the reduction in the vertical scale). Consumption will immediately
damp the shocks, largely preventing the response of other variables. In Figure 8 (which
corresponds to the third row of Table 3), we see the responses with no habit persistence
and a large proportion of forward-looking price-setters. Here the forward-lookingness of
the Phillips curve means that asymmetric shocks are stabilised relatively quickly, and as
a result ﬁscal policy makes a smaller impact in terms of welfare.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the responses to asymmetric shocks of the economy where
the Phillips curve has a longer output lag structure due to changing ϕ from 1.0 to 0.5.
The eﬀect of this is to redistribute the lagged output terms in the Phillips curve (due
to backward-looking price-setters) from all being at a lag of one quarter to half being at
a lag of one quarter and half at a lag of two quarters. Empirically, this is an entirely
plausible and seemingly relatively small change but it causes ﬁscal policy to have a much
larger welfare impact.8 Without ﬁscal policy, the lengthening of the lag structure causes
8Figure 10 shows the welfare losses in this case for a varying degrees of ﬁscal activity.
18Key Constant Active ﬁs- No Naive
parameter deﬁcit, cal policy, shocks rule
values % % % %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base case ω∗ =0 .5,ρ ∗ =0 .8 -0.25 1.58 5.34 0.96
ϕ∗ =1
No habits, but ω∗,ρ=0 ,ϕ ∗ -0.45 2.44 8.37 1.45
high inﬂation
persistence
No habits and ω =0 .1,ϕ ∗, -0.15 0.24 1.60 0.10
low inﬂation ρ =0
persistence
Increased ω∗,ρ ∗, -38 14.03 17.70 12.25
output lags in ϕ = 1
2ϕ∗
Phillips curve
Table 3: Welfare relative to that with Constant Government Spending: Consumption
gains
the economy to have very prolonged cyclical responses to asymmetric shocks even in a
model as simple as this. When the system is close to being unstable without ﬁscal policy,
the ﬁscal stabilisation then produces very large welfare gains9.
Of course, the large numerical value of the welfare gain in Table 3 in the latter case
is predominantly because the automatic stabilisers do not stabilise the economy well and
we measure all gains relative to them. One can argue that any naive rule which feeds
back on output should stabilise the economy well. The last column in Table 3 reports
the percentage change in consumption level corresponding to welfare gains using a simple
feedback rule, gt = −{0.5/(1 − θ)}xt−1, similar to the one used by Westaway (2003).
In this rule the size of the feedback coeﬃcient of the linearised rule ensures a fall in
government spending of 0.5% of GDP if GDP rises by 1%. As is apparent, in the ﬁrst two
rows the gain in consumption is still a non-trivial number around 1%. In all cases, a ﬁscal
authority with a simple rule provides a large of proportion of the welfare gains obtained
by our base case of a ﬁscal authority targetting output, inﬂation and the deﬁcit as given
in (31) and (32). However the base case active ﬁscal policy does provide a non-trivial
welfare improvement over the simple rule.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our work shows that the active use of ﬁscal policy in a monetary union can result in a
signiﬁcant increase in welfare. This welfare gain is predominantly brought about by the
9The ability of lags to cause a system to become more and more volatile has a long history in economic
literature. In the language of Phillips (1957), ﬁscal policy provides ‘derivative control’ which greatly
improves the behaviour of the lagged system.
19ability of the ﬁscal policy to mitigate the eﬀects of asymmetric shocks, and in particular
asymmetric supply shocks. Monetary policy can satisfactorily stabilise symmetric shocks
and ﬁscal policy can not greatly improve outcomes in response to such shocks. By contrast,
ﬁscal policy greatly improves the stabilisation of asymmetric shocks and substantially
increase overall welfare.
We ﬁnd that the importance of ﬁscal policy for stabilisation depends to a large extent
on the structure of the Phillips curve. When there is persistence in inﬂation, outcomes
with ﬁscal stabilisation produce signiﬁcantly lower social losses than non-strategic ﬁscal
policy (of constant deﬁcits or automatic stabilisers). This occurs with levels of inﬂation
persistence which are well within the bounds of those postulated in the empirical literature.
We also ﬁnd that ﬁscal stabilisation is more important when there are lags in the eﬀect
of demand in the Phillips curve.
This research does not take into account many of the reasons why tight restrictions on
ﬁscal policy might be desirable. For instance we do not take into account the possibility of
ﬁscal insolvency, or political economy factors which may be important. Were ﬁscal policy
to have small welfare advantages in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation, one could argue
for tight restrictions to address these problems. However, given that the ﬁscal policy can
play a very important role in macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union we argue
that a regulatory framework for ﬁscal policy should allow it to play a substantial role in
stabilising the economy.
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Figure 1: Symmetric shocks. Habit persistence. Solid line denotes unconstrained optimal
policy, dashed line denotes policy when the budget is close to balanced every period and
dotted line denots policy with constant government spendings.































































Figure 2: Asymmetric shocks. Habit persistence. Solid line denotes unconstrained optimal
policy, dashed line denotes policy when the budget is close to balanced every period and
dotted line denots policy with constant government spendings.
































































































SD(d) when G = const

















Variability of key variables
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Figure 4: Components of social loss. Habit persistence and inﬂation persistence.






















































































































































Figure 5: Social Loss due to symmetric and asymmetric shocks.










































































Figure 6: Standard deviations of key variables as a function of ﬁscal activity. Habit
persistence and inﬂation persistence. All shocks.































































Figure 7: Asymmetric shocks. No habit persistence, but with inﬂation persistence. Solid
line denotes unconstrained optimal policy, dashed line denotes policy when the budget
is close to balanced every period and dotted line denots policy with constant public
spendings.































































Figure 8: Asymmetric shocks. No habit persistence, high proportion of forward-looking
price-setters. Solid line denotes unconstrained optimal policy, dashed line denotes policy
when the budget is close to balanced every period and dotted line denots policy with
constant public spendings.































































Figure 9: Asymmetric shocks. Habit persistence, inﬂation persistence. One extra output
lag in the Phillips curve. Solid line denotes unconstrained optimal policy, dashed line
denotes policy when the budget is close to balanced every period and dotted line denots














































SD(d) when G = const
constant public spendings
no shocks
Figure 10: Social loss and consumption loss as function of ﬁscal activity. Habit persistence
and inﬂation persistence. One extra output lag in the Phillips curve
32A Price-setting decisions
Pricing behaviour is taken as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Steinsson (2003).
Households are able to reset their price in each period with probability 1 − γ in which
case they re-contract a new price Pn
H. For the rest of the household sector the price will
rise at the steady state rate of domestic inﬂation ΠH with probability γ:
PHa,t = ΠHaPHa,t−1
Those who recontract a new price (with probability 1 − γ), are split into backward-
looking individuals and forward-looking individuals, in proportion ω, such that the ag-


























t is the eﬃcient level of output.











































33where µ = −  
1− , Sa,t(z) is marginal cost and Rt,s is discount factor. This condition holds
for both ﬂexible and ﬁxed price equilibria. However, for the ﬁxed price equilibrium the
nominal marginal cost is a function of price, set at the period t. Substituting for the








































where τ is wage income tax. The linearisation of the equation (37) can be found in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for the closed economy case. We brieﬂyr e p e a ti th e r e
for the open economy.
First of all, each term in the price-setting ﬁrst order conditions (37) is the product of
two terms, the term in curly brackets and the term in square brackets. The term in the
square brackets vanishes in the equilibrium so its deviations from the equilibrium are of
ﬁrst order. Therefore, all products of it with the ﬁr s tt e r mw i l lb eh i g h e rt h a no fﬁrst
order, unless the ﬁrst term is taken at its equilibrium level, which is (γβ)s−t, up to some
constant multiplier.






































b λs + α
a


































































(b λas − b λ
n
as)]
Here we also used the fact that the linearisation of the similar equation for the ﬂexible price
equilibrium helps to get rid of shocks and write down the optimisation equation in terms
of gaps with natural levels for output and consumption. Here (αa
n b Sab +(1−αa
d −αa
n)b Saw)
comes in as the result of the wedge between consumption of the CPI basket and the
production of domestic goods and diﬀerent prices set on them. The constant tax rate,
τ, does not enter the ﬁnal formula when written in log-deviations from equilibrium (see
Benigno and Benigno (2000) for similar derivation).
This can be rewritten in a quasi-diﬀerenced form as:
b p
f
Ha,t = γβb p
f
























A.2 Rule of thumb price-setters and Phillips curve
The rule of thumb price-setters use formula (36) to set the new price. The linearisation
of this equation (using (35)) straightforwardly yields:
b P
b


















Ha,t =( 1− ω)b P
f
Ha,t−1 + ω b P
b




((1 − ω)b P
f





Ha,t = γβb p
f

















35Doing manipulations similar to Steinsson (2003) (A.1)-(A.6) we eliminate b Pb
Ha,t and b p
f
Ha,t
and obtain the following speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve
πHa,t =
γ
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
βπHa,t+1 +
ω




γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δxat−1 −
(1 − γ)γβω
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δxat
+
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))
ψ














Note that when ω =0then the Phillips curve collapses to the standard forward-looking
speciﬁcation:
πHa,t = βπHa,t+1 +





























(γβδxat − δxat−1). (41)
This equation was obtained by integrating and can contain extra solutions. We are looking
for solution without forward looking components, as suggested by initial formula (36).
Such a solution exists and can be written in the form of accelerationist Phillips curve:
πHa,t = πHa,t−1 +( 1− γ)δxat−1. (42)


















γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
(βπHa,t+1 +
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
γ
zt).
where we need to substitute (41) with (42) before doing numerical simulations:
πHa,t =
ω(1 + γβ)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
(πHa,t−1 +( 1− γ)δxat−1) (44)
+
γ(1 − ω)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
(βπHa,t+1 +
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
γ
zt).
Finally, (44) can be rewritten as
πt = χ
fβπt+1 + χ









γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
κc =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)ψ
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )σ
κx0 =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )
κx1 =
ω(1 + γβ)(1 − γ)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
δ
κsd =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψ(1 − αa
d)
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ +  )
κsn = −
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψαa
n
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ +  )
If we assume that rule of thumb individuals take more than one lag on output when
















we obtain the modiﬁed Phillips curve:
πt = χ
fβπt+1 + χ
bπt−1 + κcct + κx0xt + κx1xt−1 + κx2xt−2 + κsasas + κsbsbs (46)
with
κx0 =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)
(γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ))(ψ +  )
−
(1 − γ)γβωδ1
γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
κx1 =
(1 − γ)ω




γ + ω(1 − γ + γβ)
δ2.
37B Social loss function
The one-period utility function (for country a) can be obtained by linearisation of one-
period utility function in (1) up to the second-order terms (we assume symmetry):
Wsa + Wsb = uC(C/C
ρ,1)C











(b Cas − ρb Cas−1)b ξas]+uC(C/C
ρ,1)C











(b Cbs − ρb Cbs−1)b ξbs]














































































uC(C/Cρ,1)C−ρ. The ﬁrst condition







and in order to derive the second expression we closely follow Beetsma and Jensen (2003).
The second steady state relationship is
fG(G)




ψ (αd + αn)
(1 + (αd + αn)2 θσφ






(1 + βρ2 − βσρ(ρ +1 ) )
We now need to derive a formula for varzb y(z), along the lines in Rotemberg and


























We substitute it into (47) and take unconditional expectation of undiscounted inﬁnite
sum of intra-period welfare losses (47). The cross terms of shocks with economic variables
will disappear if we assume that shocks are uncorrelated with these variables. The linear
terms will disappear as their means are zero. The welfare loss becomes:
W = λπ(var(πa)+var(πb)) + λπµ∆π(var(∆πa)+var(∆πb)) (48)
+ λπλc(var(ca − ρca,−1)+var(cb − ρcb,−1)) + λπ(λx + µx)(var(xa)+var(xb))






 (  + ψ)(1 − βρ)γ





(1 − γ)ψθ(1 − γβ)(1 − σ)





(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 + ψ)
 (  + ψ)γ
λg =
ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − θ)(1 − γ)(1 − σg)µ(1−τ
µ ψ + θσφ(αd + αn))













Again, in the case where rule of thumb individuals take more than one lag on out-
put when setting prices, the welfare function (48) should be modiﬁed to the following
speciﬁcation (see Additional Appendix):
W = λπ(var(πa)+var(πb)) + µ∆π(var(∆πa)+var(∆πb)) (51)
+ λπλc(var(ca)+var(cb)) + λπ(λx + µx)(var(xat)+var(xbt))






























When calibrating parameters δ1 and δ2 we ﬁrst calibrate δ = δ1+δ2 as explained in Section
3 and then deﬁne δ1 = ϕ(δ1+δ2) and δ1 =( 1−ϕ)(δ1+δ2). We vary ϕ, to explore demand
eﬀects on inﬂation.
C Compensating Consumption
Having computed the social loss in stochastic equilibrium for a regime, we can give an in-
terpretation of losses in terms of ‘real world’ variables. Suppose the two diﬀerent regimes
of control give us diﬀerent values of losses due to volatility. We can ﬁnd the level of con-
sumption, which compensates the social planner for the diﬀerence in volatility between
regimes. Indeed, suppose two regimes produce the same (dis)utility due to public con-
sumption and work eﬀorts, and in the ﬁrst regime consumption is volatile with volatility
W2 and mean C, while in the second regime it is constant with mean of consumption
C + ΩC. We determine the percentage change in consumption Ω such that we have the
same utility in both regimes. We can see from the Taylor expansion derived in Appendix
B that (to a second order approximation) a measure of the utility of the non-discounting
social planner is given by
L = u(C
1−ρ)+f(G) − v(Y ) − uC(C
1−ρ,1)C
1−ρW
where W, the value of the social welfare function, is given by equation (48) and C, G
and Y refer to steady state levels of consumption, government spending and output. We
compute utility level in the ﬁrst regime. Since there is no volatility W =0 so,
L1 = u((C + ΩC)















1−ρ(1 − ρ)Ω(1 −
Ω
2





1−ρ)+f(G) − v(Y )+o(ΩC)
3
For the second regime, W = W2 and so
L2 = u(C




Therefore, an individual will be indiﬀerent between these two regimes when
(1 − ρ)Ω(1 −
Ω
2
(ρ +( 1− ρ)
1
σ
)) + W2 =0
40w h i c hi sa ne q u a t i o nf o rΩ. We can then ﬁnd compensating consumption level between
two regimes with losses due to volatility W1 and W2:
(1 − ρ)Ω(1 −
Ω
2
(ρ +( 1− ρ)
1
σ
)) + (W2 − W1)=0 . (52)
from which the relevant solution is:
Ω =
σ




(ρσ +( 1− ρ))
(1 − ρ)σ
(W2 − W1)) (53)
41